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I. Introduction
Thirty years ago, buying a camera was quite straightforward.
Anyone wishing to purchase a camera could simply walk into a
photography store, engage a salesman about their intended use and
requirements, and walk out, minutes later, ready to start practicing
* Tom Abeles has been recently admitted to the California Bar after graduating
from UC Hastings in July 2010. He served as the Executive Editor for Volume 32 of
Comm/Ent. His academic interests include all areas of intellectual property, but especially
issues related to trademarks, copyright law, and Internet privacy. In 2007 he earned
Bachelors of Arts degrees in Economics and Communications with a minor in computer
science from UC Davis. Other interests include rock climbing and mountaineering and
occasionally cycling when the weather in San Francisco cooperates.
1. HENRY FORD & SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (Doubleday
1922).
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their new hobby. Photographers had the opportunity to choose from
numerous brands and models, as long as the store carried that
particular camera. Specifications, features, and comparisons for the
world's inventory of cameras were easily located on marketing
materials, as long as the store had such literature available.
"Prospective purchasers could find opinionated reviews on any
camera available, such as from a salesperson who had used the
camera or had spoken to someone who had, or from another
customer who had the camera and happened to also be in the store at
the same time." In retrospect, buying a camera thirty years ago does
not seem straightforward at all.
Contrast this scenario with the modern digital marketplace, where
online consumers can perform extensive research into any good or
service offered for purchase. The Internet provides a platform where
not only manufacturers but also consumers and everyone in between
are able to publish price comparisons, product reviews, praises,
complaints, and examples of complementary or substitute goods.
Such user-generated content has exploded in popularity, and it is
difficult to imagine purchasing much of anything without reading at
least one product review. These reviews, either consumer or
professionally written by a third-party, have become a double-edged
sword for manufacturers. A skilled writer can extol upon the virtues
of a good or service and ensure commercial success, or alternately,
drag a brand name through the mud and effectively destroy millions
of dollars of product research, development, and marketing. It is only
natural, then, that companies would attempt to control which reviews
are posted.
The easiest way for a customer to find these reviews is through an
Internet search using a company name or product trademark as
search terms. A Google query for "Canon camera reviews" results in
reviews of cameras sold by Canon and competitors. Similarly, the
easiest way for a company to have a poor review removed from a
website would be to claim trademark infringement in a cease and
desist letter. Such a letter would claim that the reviewer's use of the
company's trademark results in consumer confusion since a consumer
may be misled into believing the website or author is associated with
the manufacturer. The Lanham Act is not completely unprepared to
handle such a scenario: The nominative fair use defense was created
to ensure that companies are not given property rights in their
trademarks, as such rights would prevent other individuals from using
them in ordinary speech. A user who decides to review their new
Apple iPad may refer to the product by its actual trademarked name,
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rather than as the "larger tablet-shaped touch-screen device designed
by the computer and electronics company based out of Cupertino,
California." In fact, large companies have little chance of winning an
injunction to remove a bad review after a trial based on trademark
infringement, but this doesn't prevent them from trying.
The problem with which this article is concerned occurs when an
in-house attorney with vast resources and experience sends a cease
and desist letter to a smaller review site, who may not have the
resources to hire an attorney. It is easy to see how a modest website
would succumb to the request of a powerful corporation, especially if
the cease and desist letter was overly intimidating. Website owners
who are unfamiliar with trademark law present an attractive target in
this situation and may not raise a nominative fair use defense, which
would not be strong enough even if they had raised it. Review sites
providing useful e-Commentary or consumer commentary, good or
bad, should be encouraged, not deterred.
The goals of this article are two-fold: (1) to educate owners of
websites that host e-commentary of their fair use rights; and (2) to
offer a solution to protect those who remain unaware, in a sense
equalizing the imbalance between the two parties caused by the
disparity in resources and experience. In the following sections, this
article presents an introduction to trademark law in the Internet
context, focusing specifically on the economics of consumer review
sites. Next, it presents an investigation of the evolution of the
nominative fair use doctrine, which can be used to help protect review
sites. We will discover that the current doctrine is ill-suited for such a
task. Third, this article will expose new issues arising out of this e-
commentary and the ways large corporations attempt to censor bad
reviews. Finally, the last sections of this article discuss reasons for
increasing protection of review sites, several proposals by scholars,
and an additional proposal that helps solve some of the new problems
previously overlooked.
II. How Trademarks in Review Websites Advance the
Primary Goal of Trademark Law
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act' and established
modern trademark protection.' When it enacted the Lanham Act, the
Senate definitively stated two principle purposes of the Act:
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1946).
3. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:4 (4th ed. 2010) (describing the legislative history of the Lanham Act).
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One is to protect the public, so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the
product, he is protected in his investment from its
misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the
trade-mark owner.
The goal of public protection is often manifested in the form of
consumer search costs. Trademarks "reduce consumer search costs
by informing people that trademarked products come from the same
source."s This principle has been characterized as the most basic
objective of trademark law,6 resulting in the production of quality
products and an efficient free market.! Trademarks accomplish this
by providing customers with a way to identify goods' expected
quality, and thus "assist in identifying goods that meet the individual
consumer's expectations."' A consumer who prefers the flavor of
Coca-Cola to Pepsi will seek out bottles of soda with the familiar logo
because they are able to rely on the trademark in order to identify the
product. It is in this way that that the reduction in consumer search
costs leads to educated consumers and creates an incentive for
companies to improve their goods and services.
The Internet has provided a shortcut to this benefit. The Internet
serves both as an efficient way for businesses to disseminate
information (such as specifications relating to their photography
equipment), and for third parties to disseminate commentary relating
to the quality and history of goods and services.o Review sites have
4. S. Rep. No. 1333-79, at 3 (1946) (quoted in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 782, n.15 (1992) (Stevens, concurring)).
5. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 1991).
6. Jonathan L. Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog's Bark as Strong as its
Gripe: Complaint Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 59, 79 (2006) (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-
64 (1995).
7. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 2:3.
8. A Bill to Strengthen the Laws Against Counterfeiting of trademarks: Hearing on
S. 2428 Before the Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 12 (1982) (Statement of William
F. Baxter, Asst. Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div.).
9. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 79.
10. Id. at 78.
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the potential to offer product comparisons, specifications, buying
guides, customer reviews, lowest prices, warnings for re-called or
defective goods, and any other information consumers may find
helpful before committing to a purchase-all from an unbiased
source.
Trademarks play an important role in these review sites. Just as
the Coca-Cola trademark aids consumers in the brick and mortar
stores to quickly and reliably find the beverage they enjoy, Internet
users must make use of companies' trademarks in order to locate
information regarding the good they are interested in. Thus, the
burden on trademarks is two-fold. First, websites hosting information
and opinions on trademarked goods and services must make use of
the trademark in order to easily identify a good or service. Second,
Internet users must search for the good or service in which they are
interested by querying for the trademark on an Internet search
engine. It would be vastly more difficult to write or read a review on
a good or service if use of the relevant trademark was prohibited.
III. The Development of the Nominative Fair Use Defense
In order to succeed on a claim of trademark infringement under
15 U.S.C. section 1114 of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove,
inter alia, that the defendant's use is likely to cause confusion "in the
minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services in
question."" The circuit courts each take a different approach when
analyzing if a defendant causes a likelihood of confusion,12 but,
generally, it is a multi-factor test based on the one delineated by
Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp."
Typical factors include:
[1] the strength of the mark, [2] the degree of similarity
between the two marks, [3] the proximity of the products, [4]
the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, [5]
actual confusion, [6] and the reciprocal of defendant's good
11. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117
(2004).
12. See Lonestar Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922 (4th
Cir. 1995); Interpace, Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983); AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979);. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287
F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
13. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
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faith in adopting its own mark, [7] the quality of defendant's
product, [8] and the sophistication of the buyers.14
In some cases, notwithstanding some likelihood of confusion, a
defendant's use will be nonetheless excused. Two doctrines of "fair
use" which exemplify this principle have evolved: classical and
nominative.
A. Fair Use Basics
The Lanham Act recognizes a defense where a trademark is used
by a defendant only "to describe the goods or services of [a] party, or
their geographic origin.", This defense arises in situations where a
plaintiff's mark has an ordinary language meaning, and the defendant
uses that word in its descriptive sense to indicate characteristics of its
product. This "classical" fair use defense prohibits a trademark
owner from "appropriating a descriptive term for his exclusive use
and excluding others from accurately describing characteristics of
their goods.""
The classical fair use defense can be interpreted as a check on the
property rights granted to the owner of a trademark. In fact, the
primary social cost of granting property rights in trademarks is the
removal of words from language." By limiting these rights for certain
classes of words, courts ensure that producers will not "deplete the
stock of useful words by asserting exclusive rights in them."" For
example, a food producer who uses as a trademark the phrase
"shredded wheat" will be unable to prevent others from using that
term to describe their product if, in fact, what they are selling is
shredded wheat.'
14. Id.
15. Not all Circuits distinguish between classic and nominative fair use. Stephanie M.
Greene, Sorting Out 'Fair Use' and 'Likelihood of Confusion' in Trademark Law, 43 AM.
Bus. L.J. 43, 50 (2006). Many courts even follow the "conventional wisdom" of treating
fair use, not as a "doctrinally distinct analysis, but merely an absence of likely confusion-
or perhaps as something of an overlay on the traditional multi-part test for likelihood of
confusion or dilution." Jonathan Moskin, Frankenlaw: The Supreme Court's Fair and
Balanced Look at Fair Use, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 848, 871 (2005).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
17. Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1991).
19. Id.
20. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938).
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In contrast, "nominative" fair use occurs when a defendant uses
the plaintiff's trademark to describe the plaintiff's product, rather
than its own.21  This is demonstrated in the early case of
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church,2 where the defendant
operated an automobile repair business specializing in the repair of
Volkswagen and Porsche vehicles. 23 Although in no way connected
with Volkswagen, Church chose as his trade name "Modern
Volkswagen Porsche Service."24 If Volkswagen were able to control
such descriptive use of its trademark, it would force automobile
repair businesses to use roundabout phrases to describe their services,
such as "[s]pecializing in the repair of automobiles manufactured by
the automobile manufacturer based in Wolfsburg, Lower Saxony,
Germany,"2 or effectively create a monopoly over Volkswagen repair
services.
B. The Ninth Circuit Mislays the Cornerstone of Nominative Fair Use
The seminal nominative fair use case is New Kids on the Block v.
News America Publishing, Inc.26 Two newspaper defendants, USA
Today and The Star, published polls of their readers seeking an
answer to a "pressing question: 'Which one of the New Kids is the
most popular?""' The New Kids on the Block sued the newspapers,
alleging an impressive ten different claims for the use of the New
21. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
22. 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 351.
24. Id.
25. It is common for scholars to create or use cumbersome synonyms for
trademarked terms to illustrate the point of how costly it would be to allow producers
broad rights in these terms. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306, n.4 ("It's far
more convenient, for example, to ask your local pharmacist for 'aspirin'-once a
trademark-than to remember to pronounce 'salicylic acid."'); Id. at 306 ("[O]ne might
refer to 'the two-time world champions' or 'the professional basketball team from
Chicago,' but it's far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago
Bulls."). See also Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002)
(highlighting the difference between "Playmate of the Year 1981" and "nude model
selected by Mr. Hefner's magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the year
1981"). One author asks "which member of a group of pre-pubescent, musically
challenged, producer-driven kids who have done well recently in the charts do you like
best?" Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law After Meddel'in v.
Texas: Article: Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing
Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 110 (2009).
26. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 304.
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Kids' trademark.' The court pointed to a pair of cases illustrating the
difficulty presented.29
In discussing the Volkswagenwerk case, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the defendant did not suggest to customers that his repair shop
bore any relation to Volkswagen or that he was in any way sponsored
by the car manufacturer. 0  Instead, he merely used the words
"Volkswagen" and "VW" to convey to consumers information about
the types of cars he repaired." In WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic
Ass'n,32 the Athletic Association unsuccessfully prevented the
television channel from using the trademark "Boston Marathon" in
its programming." The Ninth Circuit summarized these cases as
special situations involving a "non-trademark use of a mark-a use to
which the infringement laws simply do not apply."' Cases which
present nominative uses of a mark lie outside the strictures of
trademark law because they do not "implicate the source-
identification function that is the purpose of trademark, [and they do]
not constitute unfair competition; such uses are fair because [they do]
not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder."
This characterization is reflected in the Ninth Circuit's later opinion
of Cairns v. Franklin Mint Company," in which the court
distinguished classical fair use from nominative fair use on the ground
that where classical fair use "complements" the likelihood of
confusion analysis, nominative fair use analysis "replaces" the
likelihood of confusion analysis.3 ' As will be discussed infra, it is
28. Id. at 304-05.
29. Id. at 307.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991).
33. Id. at 46.
The words "Boston Marathon" ... do more than call attention to
Channel 5's program; they also describe the event that Channel 5 will
broadcast. Common sense suggests (consistent with the record here) that
a viewer who sees those words flash upon the screen will believe that
Channel 5 will show, or is showing, or has shown, the marathon, not that
Channel 5 has some special approval from the [trademark holder] to do
so. In technical trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive
purposes is called a "fair use," and the law usually permits it even if the
words themselves also constitute a trademark. Id.
34. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 308.
36. 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at 1151.
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surprising that courts have ignored or struggled with this seemingly
bright-line and simple characterization of nominative fair use.
The Ninth Circuit devised a three-prong test to evaluate
nominative fair use cases. Defendants will be entitled to the
nominative fair use defense if they meet all the requirements:
(1) the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark;
(2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and
(3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with
the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.39
By constructing this scheme, the court "replaced" the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis." The Ninth Circuit later elaborated
that the likelihood of confusion analysis does not apply in part
because it "would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all
nominative uses are confusing."41 This test creates a divide between
whatever confusion results from permissible nominative fair uses of a
mark and impermissible confusion created by suggesting affiliation.42
However, the defendant holds the burden of proving that no
impermissible confusion had been created.43
Although properly motivated (an analysis separate from
likelihood of confusion is required to handle nominative fair use
cases), shifting the burden to the defendant causes problems in the
future. As it turns out, courts' analyses of whether a use is
nominative or not bears striking resemblance to a likelihood of
confusion analysis. This has the effect of placing the burden on the
defendant in the first place to prove that there is no likelihood of
38. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
39. Id.
40. Scott M. Smedresman, Fixing Nominative Fair Use: An Analysis of Nominative
Use Jurisprudence and a Suggestion on How to Resolve its Conflicts, 15 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 103, 123 (2007).
41. Id. (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d at 801) ("Since one of the
most influential factors in a likelihood of confusion analysis is the identity of the marks, in
a situation where both marks are identical, such as any nominative fair use, a court is
extremely likely to find a likelihood of confusion.").




confusion. The Ninth Circuit could not foresee this issue, and there
was no guidance on how this problem could be resolved, especially
within a realm "outside the strictures of trademark law.""
C. The Supreme Court Attempts to Repair the Ninth Circuit's Error
Over ten years after New Kids on the Block was decided, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case that would prove
influential to nominative fair use analysis. KP Permanent Make- Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression, a case arising out of the Ninth Circuit,
addressed the issue of whether a party raising a classical fair use
defense has a burden to negate any likelihood of confusion.45
In 1992, Lasting Impression began using "micro colors" as a
trademark for its line of permanent makeup pigments.46 In 1999, KP
began to use the term "micro color" in its marketing brochures to
describe its goods, and not as a mark.47  After suing Lasting
Impression for declaratory relief, KP filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was granted by the district court.48 The district court
determined that the term "micro color" was generic and that KP was
protected by the fair use defense of the Lanham Act.49 Since the use
was fair, the district court declined to discuss any likelihood of
confusion."o
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that, after
Cairns, a classic fair use analysis could only be undertaken after an
inquiry into the likelihood of confusion." Because a likelihood of
confusion analysis raises genuine issues of material fact, KP's motion
for summary judgment was inappropriate.52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle a circuit split "on
the significance of likely confusion for a fair use defense to a
trademark infringement claim, and the obligation of a party
defending on that ground to show that its use is unlikely to cause
44. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
45. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 114.
46. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065
(9th Cir. 2003). Permanent makeup is similar to a tattoo, since it is pigment injected into
the skin. Id. Micropigmentation, another term used to describe permanent makeup, has
both medical and cosmetic applications. Id.
47. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 115.
48. KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1066.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1071-72.
52. Id. at 1072-73.
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consumer confusion."" The Court began with a textual analysis of
Section 1115(b)(4) of the Lanham Act.' Since Congress remained
silent on the issue of likelihood of confusion when it set out the
elements of the fair use defense in Section 1115(b)(4), it is unlikely
that they intended to lay the burden upon the defendant." After
considering how fundamental the idea of confusion is to the Lanham
Act and rules of statutory interpretation, the Court decided that it
was not an oversight on Congress' part to omit any burden shifting."
Next, the Court recognized that under common law, some degree of
confusion was permitted." Combining these two points, some
amount of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use."
The Supreme Court finally held:
[A] plaintiff claiming infringement... must show likelihood
of consumer confusion as part of the prima facie case, while
the defendant has no independent burden to negate the
likelihood of any confusion in raising the affirmative defense
53. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116-17.
54. Id. at 118. The relevant text of the statute is:
[T]o the extent the right to use a registered mark has become
incontestable under Section 1065 of this title . . . [s]uch conclusive
evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to proof
of infringement as defined in Section 1114 of this title, and shall be
subject to the following defenses or defects: . . . (4) That the use of the
name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.
15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4) (2002).
55. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 118.
56. Id. "'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' Id.
57. Id. at 119.
58. Id. at 121-22. "The Court also explained that because, logically, the [statutory]
defense of fair use would only arise where a plaintiff is able to satisfy its burden of proving
a likelihood of confusion, it would 'defy logic to argue that a defense may not be asserted
in the only situation where it even becomes relevant."' Moskin, supra note 15, at 853
(citing KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 120). The Court reinforced its point, stating that it
would not make sense "to provide an affirmative defense of no confusion plus good faith,
when merely rebutting the plaintiffs case on confusion would entitle the defendant to
judgment, good faith or not. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 120.
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that a term is used descriptively, not as a mark, fairly, and in
good faith. 9
In holding the above, it would appear that the Supreme Court
shouldered much of, if not the entire, burden on the plaintiff.
However, in dicta, the Court noted that although "fair use can occur
along with some degree of confusion, this does not foreclose the
relevance of the extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing
whether a defendant's use is objectively fair."a This presents an
intriguing problem for defendants. If a defendant has the burden of
proving that its use was fair, and the defendant has no independent
burden to negate the likelihood of confusion in raising this defense,
then how can confusion be relevant in assessing the fairness of the
defendant's use? The Supreme Court has offered very little guidance
on the matter.
D. The Third Circuit's Voice of Reason-Ignored
In 2004, the Third Circuit asked to what extent the Supreme
Court's reasoning in KP Permanent applies to the nominative fair use
analysis in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc.62
Unfortunately, the proper approach for the nominative fair use
defense was voiced in the dissent, authored by Judge Fisher.3 At the
time the case was decided, few courts had opportunity to apply a
nominative fair use analysis.'
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id. at 123.
61. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 123. Amicus briefs submitted urged the Court to hold
that "the degree of likely consumer confusion bears not only on the fairness of using a
term, but even on the further question [of] whether an originally descriptive term has
become so identified as a mark that a defendant's use of it cannot realistically be called
descriptive." Id.
62. 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
63. Id. at 232.
64. Id. at 218.
[O]nly the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits had even referenced the
nominative fair use defense by name, and in those occasions, only did so
to refer to what district courts had done with the issue or to decline to
adopt the Ninth Circuit's test. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282
F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court had applied the
standard for nominative fair use as articulated by the Ninth Circuit, but
finding that the court had erred in its application); see also Pebble Beach
Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting the
Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use test in part); Interactive Products
Corp. v. Azz Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 n.6 (6th Cir.
2003) (footnoting why a district court case involving the nominative fair
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LendingTree is a website that helps users identify and select
"qualified lenders, real estate brokers, auto insurers, and other
financial service companies."" LendingTree provides information
about real estate companies that participate in the referral network
(approximately one-third of which include franchises owned by one
of the three plaintiffs).' Century 21 (and co-plaintiffs Coldwell
Banker and ERA) brought suit after discovering several uses of the
plaintiffs' marks present on LendingTree's website.6 ' The district
court held that LendingTree's use was likely to cause consumer
confusion, and that the nominative use defense did not protect them
in this case.68
On appeal, the majority began with an extensive analysis of the
New Kids on the Block decision, eventually recognizing that applying
the likelihood of confusion test in nominative fair use cases would
disadvantage the defendant by "making confusion an all but foregone
conclusion."69 Because the two marks being compared are identical,
applying the likelihood of confusion test in a nominative fair use
situation would almost always result in a finding of confusion."o The
Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that classical fair use
and nominative fair use differed enough to warrant separate
analysis." In a footnote, the court expressed some confusion toward
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that nominative use lies "outside the
strictures of trademark law."7 2 Although quickly dispatched, it is
notable that the court highlighted this reasoning of the Ninth Circuit.
The Century 21 court adopted a two-step approach to analyze
nominative fair use cases." First, a plaintiff must prove that confusion
is likely due to the defendant's use of plaintiff's mark.74 Second, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that its nominative use of
use defense was distinguishable from the case before it); PACAAR Inc.
v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003)
(declining to follow the Ninth Circuit's analysis and applying the
likelihood of confusion test instead).
Id.
65. Id. at 215.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 215-16.
68. Id. at 216.
69. Id. at 220.
70 Id. at 221.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 221, n. 1.
73. Id. at 222.
74. Id.
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plaintiff's mark is nonetheless fair. Under the Third Circuit's
nominative fair use test (heavily derived from the Ninth Circuit's
test), a defendant must show:
(1) that the use of plaintiff's mark is necessary to describe
both the plaintiff's product or service and the defendant's
product or service;
(2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff's
mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff's product or service;
and
(3) that the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true
and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant's
products or services.
The majority attempted to rebut Judge Fisher's argument that the
factors in the test place a heavy burden on the defendant to negate
the likelihood of confusion." Instead, the majority accidentally made
light of the likelihood of confusion factor. The court insisted that any
test must allow for the possibility of some likelihood of confusion in
combination with fair use." It added that "neither classic or
nominative fair use should rise and fall based on a finding of a
likelihood of confusion."79  The court concluded that the initial
inquiry in both cases should be into the likelihood of confusion
without explaining why this is the case." Instead, the court simply
noted that the only court to analyze nominative fair use after KP
Permanent has "embraced this logic.""
In order to reconcile its earlier finding that applying the
likelihood of confusion test in nominative fair use cases would
disadvantage the defendant,2 the court modified the likelihood of
confusion test and included only those factors that are meaningful




78. Id. at 222.
79. Id. at 222-23.
80. Id. at 223.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 216.
83. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224.
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confusion factors that the Third Circuit deemed most relevant
included:
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the
care and attention of consumers when making a purchase;
(2) the length of time the defendant has used the mark
without evidence of actual confusion;
(3) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; and
(4) the evidence of actual confusion.
These four factors are used to analyze the likelihood of confusion
as to the relationship or affiliation between a trademark owner and a
junior user." The court adopts the bifurcated approach with the
intention of distributing the burden of proof between parties at each
stage of the analysis.' In the majority's view, "[t]he defendant has no
burden to show fairness until the plaintiff first shows confusion.""
Judge Fisher concurred in part and dissented in part with the
majority's opinion." He agreed that "proper nominative use is
permissible use," that "the burden of proving likelihood of confusion
should remain with the plaintiff," and that the four factors cropped
from the likelihood of confusion analysis are appropriate inquiries.'
However, Fisher did not agree with the bifurcated approach, arguing
that it placed a heavy burden on the defendant to negate confusion.'
He criticized the majority for designing this analysis, despite
"professing a 'firm conviction' that the burden of proving likely
confusion lies with the plaintiff."9'
Fisher was primarily bothered by the majority's intent to draft the
nominative fair use defense as an affirmative defense, designed to be
proven only after likelihood of confusion has been caused by a
defendant. 2 Fisher correctly pointed out that the Ninth Circuit made
it clear that the nominative fair use analysis replaces the normal
84. Id. at 225-26.
85. Id. at 226.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id.




92. Id. at 233.
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likelihood of confusion analysis.93  Furthermore, KP Permanent
emphasized that it was improper to lay any burden of proving non-
confusion onto a defendant." The effect of the Third Circuit's
bifurcated test is to mask a secondary likelihood of confusion analysis
and call it a nominative fair use inquiry.5 Interestingly, J. Thomas
McCarthy argues the opposite of Judge Fisher.96 In recognizing that
the test proposed by the Ninth Circuit was never meant to serve as an
affirmative defense to trademark infringement, McCarthy states that,
"in the Third Circuit, nominative fair use is the basis for a defendant's
motion for summary judgment, ultimately leading to dismissal."' A
defendant can argue that "even assuming that plaintiff can prove a
likelihood of confusion, if the three Century 21 questions are
answered positively, the case can be immediately dismissed without
delving into the slippery issue of likelihood of confusion." 98 While at
first this appears to be a satisfying solution, buried in the three
questions of the Century 21 analysis is, in fact, a likelihood of
confusion inquiry.
Fisher emphasized that the majority offered little guidance in
what would serve as proof of intent." The dissenter located three
options: "the purpose of a defendant's use," "the prominence of the
use," and "the truthfulness of the use," but discovered that these
three prongs are simply inquiries into the likelihood of confusion.1 0
Judge Fisher accused the majority of attempting to "dress up the
Ninth Circuit's test in new clothes," but fell into the same trap and
93. Id. at 233-34.
94. Id. at 234.
95. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 236.
A District Court in Maryland has criticized all three elements, noting
that the first and third prong are nothing more than "a restatement of
two basic principles of trademark law." First, that use of a mark "is not
prohibited if the use is intended merely to refer to the holder of the
mark," and second, that such reference "is permissible provided it is not
likely to cause confusion." Similarly, the second prong "appeared to
derive from a concern that confusion as to affiliation may result if the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark exceeds its legitimate referential
purpose."
Id. (citations omitted). This inquiry is a repetition of facts that must be proven as part of
the "plaintiffs prima facie case of infringement." Id.
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 31:156.50.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 240 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 240-42.
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repeated the error of "placing the burden of negating confusion on
the defendant."01
One of Judge Fisher's most interesting points is about the judicial
manageability of the majority's scheme. Fisher argued that the
bifurcated approach renders the nominative fair use defense available
only in cases where it is unneeded, and unavailable when it is." Of
course, it is useless to create a defense that cannot be asserted in
situations where it is needed.o3
In his conclusion, Judge Fisher recommended that for cases
involving nominative use, courts should consider the likelihood of
confusion factors except for the factors considering the degree of
similarity and the strength of the mark. The effect of this test would
be to keep the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but remove the factors
101. Id. at 243.
102. Id. Judge Fisher's logic is as follows:
Where a court finds the use to be made with the intent to confuse, then a
finding of likelihood of confusion will often follow. According to the
majority, in such a case, a defendant could then assert nominative fair
use. However, such a defense would be hollow indeed, because the
entire "nominative fair use" defense asks whether the use was made with
the intent to confuse. Thus, a defendant found to have caused likely
confusion due to illegitimate purpose, overly prominent use, or
untruthfulness will be unable to assert a successful "nominative fair use"
defense. Conversely, in cases where the alleged nominative use is made
with good-faith purpose, is not overly prominent, and is truthful, then a
plaintiff will likely fail in proving its case of likely confusion. In that case,
the defense will be unneeded.
Id. In a footnote, Fisher hypothesizes a situation in which the reverse would be true:
[T]he majority argues that "it is the circumstance in which a court does
not find bad intent but does find confusion that a nominative fair use
defense will be most useful." Ironically, such a use would be almost the
only circumstance where a nominative fair use defense would even
theoretically be available. If likelihood of confusion exists due to bad
intent, the defense will be unavailable because the intent is bad. If
likelihood of confusion doesn't exist, then the defense won't [be] needed.
This leaves the circumstance noted by the majority: if likelihood of
confusion is somehow shown despite a lack of bad intent, defendant can
point to its good intent to prevail. But considering that a key inquiry in a
nominative use case is why the defendant has used the plaintiffs mark
(purpose) and how it has been used (prominence and truthfulness), it is
hard to imagine a case where necessary, non-prominent, and truthful use
would be likely to confuse.
Id. at 243, n. 25 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 244.
104. Id. at 248.
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considering the similarity of the marks and products, since they would
be redundant. 5
One thing is absolutely clear after reviewing the circuit courts'
creation of the nominative fair use defense-it is a lengthy and
cumbersome process to assert it.
IV. A Two-Star Discussion of Review Sites
Now that the basic judicial understanding of nominative fair use
has been laid out, it makes sense to review the scenario with which
this article is primarily concerned: review sites. Consumer
commentary takes various forms on the Internet. Gripe sites are
websites dedicated to criticizing one product or manufacturer. 0 6
General complaint sites have been created as a catch-all for various
consumer gripes.o Gripe sites were the target of many suits alleging
initial interest confusion and infringement for trademark use in meta-
tags and web addresses, and are distinct from the discussion in this
article aside from the fact that they consist of nominative fair use.
Although they raise nominative fair use issues, these cases differ from
review sites because they typically reflect the opinions of a single
person and are very targeted. A review site, on the other hand,
invites the review of many users and contains reviews about several
products or services from several producers, in one or more genres of
goods or services. Reviews posted on these sites may be the product
of a professional reviewer, whose duties entail receiving goods and
services (often free of charge) and writing a review of the product for
hosting on their employer's website (distinct and unrelated to the
producer of the product) after a period of experimentation and use.
Returning to the example of purchasing a camera, a review site
may include user-generated reviews of cameras, film, lenses, and
other accessories." The Digital Camera section of CNET.com
provides "Buyers' Guides" for both digital cameras and digital SLR
cameras in addition to camera reviews.' 8 These resources directly
provide consumers with the benefits that trademark law hopes to
indirectly achieve through its goals, specifically, reducing consumer
105. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 250 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
106. See Schwartz, supra note 6 at 66-69.
107. Id. at 69.
108. See, e.g., DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVIEW, http://www.dpreview.com/ (last
visited May 4, 2010).
109. DIGITAL CAMERAS, CNET.coM, http://reviews.cnet.com/digital-cameras/ (last
visited May 4, 2010).
[33:2198 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
search costs."o Three specific benefits of gripe sites have been
identified, and these may be echoed for review sites:
First, they are beneficial as a critical element of free speech
because they offer disgruntled consumers an opportunity to
post messages "at a minimum of time and cost." Second, the
sites serve as "industry watchdogs" and force the
improvement of a company's goods and services by pressuring
companies and giving consumers increased leverage in getting
their problems solved. Similarly, some companies tend to
monitor gripe sites to identify problems with their products
and services. One individual built a protest site,
www.dunkindonuts.org, to complain that the chain did not
offer a particular low-fat coffee creamer. In the end, Dunkin
Donuts apologized, offered coupons, started carrying the
creamer, and eventually bought the website. In another
instance, environmental activists built a protest site,
www.HomeDepotsucks.com, for the purpose of "pressuring
Home Depot to stop selling wood from engendered forests ...
Later that year, Home Depot announced it would" begin
phasing out the practice, discounting the role that the website
had in the decision. The third benefit is the dissemination of
opinions to other customers and the facilitation of informed
decisions. Accordingly, consumers now have access to a wider
range of information about a company and are "not limited
[entirely] to the company's own advertising.".."
Unlike its gripe site cousin, review sites also offer benefits to
producers in addition to consumers. Because the character of review
sites permits good reviews alongside criticisms, companies providing a
quality good or service can realize an increase in goodwill from such
reviews. Businesses that take advantage of this "feedback loop"
often see increased customer loyalty even in the face of poor
110. Interestingly, courts have recognized that fair use cases present situations in
which slight danger of confusion accompanies any use of another's mark. Smedresman,
supra note 40, at 114. This occurs because the exact mark is being used on a product
unrelated to the product it was intended for use on. Id. This effect is only exacerbated by
the fact that many consumers are ignorant or inattentive and are likely to misunderstand
the use regardless of the care taken by a producer. Id. Proper nominative use provides a
benefit to consumers, even the inattentive ones. In fact, customers who are not familiar
with purchasing complex goods have more to gain from buying guides and consumer
reviews than their savvy counterparts.
111. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 76-77 (citations omitted).
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reviews.112 Unfortunately, corporate America largely turns a blind
eye to these benefits and only sees the potential of having their
reputation destroyed with the force of a "devastating hurricane."" 3 It
is in response to this fear that the lawsuits begin.
Review sites operated by a single individual or small company are
especially vulnerable to a trademark infringement lawsuit. A large
company (such as eBay.com or Amazon.com) is more likely to
employ in-house counsel to deal with a lawsuit. However, small
review sites have come under attack by "'corporate monoliths"'
uncomfortable in the Internet marketplace, where "money and power
do not overwhelm the loudness of one's voice."114  By taking
advantage of an individual's inexperience with the legal system and
the resource disparity between the two parties, corporations believe
they have the upper hand" and use trademark law as "an
intimidating vehicle to suppress legitimate, noncommercial speech."116
Lawyers for the Public Citizen Litigation Group, an organization
that has represented several gripe site operators, has dealt with
several instances of companies filing lawsuits against individuals
simply to wear them down with no reasonable expectation of winning
at trial."' A corporate cease and desist letter often is enough to
coerce an individual to take down a challenged website."8 Not only
does this pose the danger of "corporate hegemony of ideas
threatening the foundation of our free society,"" 9 but more
importantly, it impedes the primary purpose of trademark law; an
ordinary consumer who relies on review sites has no way of knowing
why the site was taken down or if a poor review had been posted and
then later removed. This affects the reliability of review sites.
Misleading and censored review sites may as well be corporate
112. Mirela Iverac, The Upside of Bad Online Customer Reviews, FORBES.COM (AUG.
4,2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/04/bad-customer-reviews-entrepreneurs-
management-ebags.html.
113. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 78.
114. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 70-71 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 71.
116. Id. at 63.
117. Id. at 72.
118. Id. "Trademark law, then, often serves as a blunt instrument of cultural
intimidation and censorship. The actual risk of market fraud or confusion may be remote.
But that is frequently not the real concern of many trademark holders, who care only
about squelching ridicule or criticism." DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES, THE
QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL CULTURE 84 (2005).
119. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 72.
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advertisements that were the only resource for customers before the
emergence of the online marketplace.
V. The Need for 'Real' Defenses in Trademark Law
This relatively new emergence of consumer commentary sites has
not been met with an equal expansion in trademark defenses, as
Professor Dinwoodie argues should be the case.12' To illustrate this
parallel movement, Dinwoodie points to the 2006 legislation of the
Lanham Act, which added express defenses to the dilution cause of
action, including a nominative fair use defense. 121 The development
of these defenses demonstrates the need to adopt specific defenses as
the scope of rights expands.122 It also "highlights the particular
importance of defenses where the basic proscription inadequately or
incompletely reflects the values or purposes of protection, as may also
be true in traditional infringement context."123
As a result of the evolution of the function of trademarks over the
past forty years, traditional infringement action has expanded,
124ecalbroadening protection for the trademark owner. Dinwoodie calls
for a symmetric exclusion of certain uses (even confusing ones) from
liability though defenses that are independent from a confusion
analysis12 5- "real" defenses, as he labels them.126
Real defenses, he offers, will help protect values on both sides of
trademark law including "respecting free speech, ensuring free
competition, facilitating public health policy, enabling artistic
creativity, allowing comtive advertising, nurturing a climate of
certainty for innovators, avoiding the chill of abuse of rights in
litigation, and reflecting commercial ethics." 127  This list of policy
concerns is likely to evolve as trademarks take on new social and
commercial roles. Dinwoodie concludes by discussing litigation
effects on speech and competition:
The inability practically, because of uncertainties or burdens
of proof, to vindicate rights without substantial litigation can
120. Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 116-17.
121. Id. at 117-19.
122. Id. at 119.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 120.
125. Id. at 120-21.
126. Id. at 121.




have a chilling effect on permissible speech and competitive
activities. The Supreme Court has recognized as much in
recent case law. Indeed, a number of substantive doctrines
can be explained in terms of enforcement costs. It may be
that some defenses need to take the form of trumping
defenses in order to provide the certainty necessary for rights
of the defendant to be real. Thus procedural issues (or
enforcement costs) are a countervailing "value" that needs
also to be part of the discussion about defenses.129
The archetypal "real" defense as applied in a nominative fair use
context would permit a nominative fair user to file a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
However, given courts' reluctance to grant summary judgment
motions in the face of the highly factual likelihood of confusion
analysis,'30 it is no surprise that motions to dismiss are similarly
forbidden, even if there is a clear nominative fair use.
In Americash Loans, LLC v. AO Ventures, LLC,"' a district court
in Illinois denied defendant's motion to dismiss.'32 The court's
reasoning for this denial was that prior courts have only considered
summary judgment motion in this sort of situation.'3 ' However, in
addition to proving that their use was a nominative fair one, AO
Ventures offered several convincing arguments in attempt to
persuade the court that they did have discretion in this matter to
dismiss the suit.'" The court's unsatisfying rationale for denying the
motion to dismiss demonstrates the need for real defenses unique to
trademark law.
VI. Suggestions to Fix Nominative Fair Use
Having a strong defense that can be asserted in a trademark
infringement suit does little good if review sites succumb to the
intimidation of corporate giants and poor reviews are removed before
the filing of a claim. A number of scholars have offered some
proposals that attempt to repair the confusion caused by the courts'
129. Id. at 152.
130. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 32:120.
131. 2009 WL 743010 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2009).
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id. at 5.
134. See AO Ventures LLC's Motion to Dismiss, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 85147
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2008).
202 [33:2
analysis of nominative fair use, but do not address this pre-litigation
issue.
One commentator suggests that nominative fair use cases can be
brought within the statutory language of Section 1115 of the Lanham
Act "as long as one is willing to acknowledge that use of an
established trademark to describe or identify the goods or services
sold under the mark or to identify the mark itself is a use 'other than
as a trademark."""5 This would be easier accomplished if the
following minor change (in italics) were made to the statute:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name
of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin, or to refer to or comment upon the
trademark or the trademark owner's goods or services.3 1
This elegant and simple modification would certainly offer a
bright-line defense to review site operators, but it does little to deter
corporate bullies who send intimidating cease and desist letters with
little regard to trial success.
Another scholar suggests that by shifting all of the burden of
proof to a plaintiff, Judge Fisher's complaints of the Third Circuit
majority's decision can be satisfied.' This test would require a
plaintiff to prove that:
First, the product in question [is] readily identifiable without
use of the trademark; second, [the amount needed to]
reasonably ... identify the product or service [has been
exceeded by the defendant]; and third, the [defendant has
done actions which], in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
This new formulation has several benefits. Plaintiffs no longer
have to prove the likelihood of confusion factors of a traditional
135. Moskin, supra note 15, at 873. Professor Dinwoodie suggests the same proposal
in his lecture. Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 131-32.
136. Moskin, supra note 15, at 873 n.104.
137. Smedresman, supra note 40, at 132-33.
138. Id.
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infringement suit; instead, they are given broad discretion in doing so
as they see fit through the third prong."9 Additionally, "by having
one inquiry, with the burden placed on the plaintiffs, the Third
Circuit's problem of redundancy is solved."" It is the commentator's
hope that by placing the burden on the plaintiff in this manner, that
junior users would not be fearful of making nominative uses of marks
resulting in expensive litigation.' Optimally, "only serious
overreaching by a nominative fair user would be pursued."'42
However, given the propensity of mark owners to send intimidating
cease and desist letters with little to no expectation of a successful
result in court, this analysis would only have the effect of dissuading
litigation between two large companies with extensive legal resources.
VII. Proposal to Fully Protect e-Commentary
There are two distinct events that must be accounted for in a
nominative fair use defense: First, courts must ensure that cease and
desist letters are only sent to defendants who are in fact infringing on
a plaintiff's mark-by causing confusion-and not simply
commenting upon the plaintiff's mark; second, the fair use analysis
must not lay any improper burden on the defendant to negate a
likelihood of confusion. The two proposals cited above together or in
part should be strong enough to equip courts to handle the second
issue, but do nothing for the first. It is difficult to control such
strategic actions of aggressive plaintiffs, but a carefully constructed
incentive will have the desired effect.
Courts should create and require a Miranda-type warning for
nominative fair use trademark cases, persuading trademark owners to
advise potential defendants of possible defenses, including the
nominative fair use defense. A warning of this sort would serve two
purposes: first, to educate review site owners of their rights and the
nominative fair use defense; and second, to deter trademark owners
from sending such letters in the first place.
A trademark owner is unlikely to send a cease and desist letter to
a nominative fair user if it contains a disclaimer of potential defenses
available to the recipient. Doing so would be the equivalent of
honorably admitting bad faith. If a trademark owner actually
believes that the junior user is committing trademark infringement





and causing a likelihood of confusion, the warning would create a
presumption of good faith on the part of the plaintiff. The opposite is
true for a trademark owner who sends a cease and desist letter
without a warning: If the use is later found to have been fair, there
shall be a presumption of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff who
shall be required to pay the defendant's attorney's fees (and
compensatory damages, if any). This damage award may be
increased if the facts show extreme bad faith or inappropriate
intimidation.
Borrowing this warning from criminal procedure would allow
courts to implement similar principles. The Miranda warning was
designed to equalize an imbalance of power in the inherently
intimidating context of a police custodial interrogation."" In the same
way, the imbalance created by experience and resource differences
can be equalized in the trademark context. With this strong
disincentive, large corporations will police themselves and refrain
from censoring bad reviews. At the same time, the fear is reduced
that review sites are being threatened and censored. Under the
current doctrine, it is difficult to learn if a review site was removed,
censored, altered, or remains unbiased.
A proper "Nominative Fair Use Warning" should include the
following: (1) it should identify the recipient as someone who is using
the sender's trademark to refer to a good or service produced by the
sender; (2) it should advise the recipient that he/she may qualify for
certain defenses unavailable to ordinary infringers; and (3) it should
also state that failure to include this warning may result in the
reimbursement of the recipient's attorneys fees by the sender.
VIII. Conclusion
The current nominative fair use analysis as applied by courts is ill-
equipped to handle the changing dynamic of the modern
marketplace. The two-stage Century 21 formulation inappropriately
places the burden of proving likelihood of confusion on the
defendant. Furthermore, the complex analysis does nothing to
protect nominative fair users who are intimidated by powerful
corporations into removing or modifying commentary through
aggressive cease and desist letters. A combination of adjusting the
Lanham Act or Century 21 defenses and a Miranda-type warning will
143. See generally, Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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not only effectively defend nominative fair uses, but also encourage
the valuable practice of offering e-commentary to the public.
